Risk Management and Climate Change by Kunreuther, Howard et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers Wharton Faculty Research
5-2013
Risk Management and Climate Change
Howard Kunreuther
University of Pennsylvania
Geoffrey Heal
Myles Allen
Ottmar Edenhofer
Christopher B. Field
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons, Other Education Commons, and the Other
Environmental Sciences Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/110
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kunreuther, H., Heal, G., Allen, M., Edenhofer, O., Field, C. B., & Yohe, G. (2013). Risk Management and Climate Change. Nature
Climate Change, 5 447-450. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1740
Risk Management and Climate Change
Abstract
The selection of climate policies should be an exercise in risk management reflecting the many relevant
sources of uncertainty. Studies of climate change and its impacts rarely yield consensus on the distribution of
exposure, vulnerability or possible outcomes. Hence policy analysis cannot effectively evaluate alternatives
using standard approaches, such as expected utility theory and benefit-cost analysis. This Perspective
highlights the value of robust decision-making tools designed for situations such as evaluating climate policies,
where consensus on probability distributions is not available and stakeholders differ in their degree of risk
tolerance. A broader risk-management approach enables a range of possible outcomes to be examined, as well
as the uncertainty surrounding their likelihoods.
Disciplines
Environmental Studies | Other Education | Other Environmental Sciences
Author(s)
Howard Kunreuther, Geoffrey Heal, Myles Allen, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christopher B. Field, and Gary Yohe
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/110
1 
Risk Management and Climate Change  
Howard Kunreuther, Geoffrey Heal, Myles Allen, Ottmar Edenhofer, 
Christopher B. Field, Gary Yohe 
Forthcoming in Nature Climate Change  
5 October 2012 
 
Preface 
The selection of climate policies should be an exercise in risk management reflecting the many 
relevant sources of uncertainty. Studies of climate change and its impacts rarely yield consensus 
on the distribution of exposure, vulnerability, or possible outcomes.  Hence policy analysis 
cannot effectively evaluate alternatives using standard approaches such as expected utility theory 
and benefit-cost analysis. This Perspective highlights the value of robust decision-making tools 
designed for situations, such as evaluating climate policies, where generally agreed-upon 
probability distributions are not available and stakeholders differ in their degree of risk tolerance. 
This broader risk management approach enables one to examine a range of possible outcomes 
and the uncertainty surrounding their likelihoods.  
 
Introduction 
The scientific understanding of climate change and its impacts has increased dramatically in 
recent years, but several interacting sources of uncertainty mean that future climate change and 
its impacts will not be known with precision for the foreseeable future. Some uncertainties 
involve the path of global socioeconomic development, the way it affects the commitment by 
countries to use energy efficient technologies and how greenhouse gas emissions might respond 
to specific climate-related policies.  Other uncertainties involve internal variability and 
incomplete understanding of the climate system and broader Earth-system feedbacks. Still other 
uncertainties involve the way that changes in climate translate to impacts such as changes in 
water availability, agricultural production, sea level rise, or heat waves in different parts of the 
world. A final set involves the evolution of assets at risk (exposure) both in physical and in 
monetary terms and the level of protection that can be undertaken to reduce their vulnerability to 
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potential losses (i.e., adaptation measures). The implication of these interacting sources of 
uncertainty is that choosing among climate policies is intrinsically an exercise in risk 
management.  
 
A principal purpose of risk management is to evaluate strategies for responding to an uncertain 
threat. To illustrate this point in the context of a simple example, consider a coastal community 
in Florida deciding whether land 3 meters above sea level is a suitable location for construction 
of a new residential development to be occupied for most of the current century. Suppose that the 
best estimate of the maximum storm surge plus sea level rise over this period is 2 meters. In this 
case, the project looks safe. But if there is a chance of a storm surge plus sea level rise that is 
substantially greater, it is less attractive. So a forecast of 2 meters is very different from a 
forecast of 1 to 4 meters with 2 meters as the most likely outcome. Key decision-makers in the 
community need to know the range of possible outcomes so they can determine the robustness of 
policy decisions. The final decision on whether to build the residential development, and the 
maximum it is sensible to pay for the land, will be influenced by the characterization of the risk.  
 
For decisions regarding climate policy, the central importance of uncertainty has long been 
recognized.  Schneider1 and colleagues were pioneers in posing policy questions in the context of 
risk and in introducing conceptual frameworks for managing that risk.  Recent research takes a 
more formal approach, highlighting the importance of specifying uncertainty as a key policy 
input. Worst-case scenarios -- the possibility of extremely costly outcomes with small but 
positive probabilities -- can have massive impacts on the cost-benefit analysis of climate change 
mitigation, and on the perspectives of key decision-makers. These low-probability high-
consequence events have motivated a focus on the tail of the distribution of outcomes2,3. For 
example, a 5% chance of a truly unacceptable temperature increase may have a significant 
impact when evaluating the expected benefits and costs of climate adaptation and mitigation 
policies.  
 
To date, much of the focus in assessments of climate change and its impacts has been on central 
tendencies. Uncertainty in future climates is most often represented as the range of outcomes 
generated by different climate models run for a range of scenarios. There are, however, 
3 
numerous physical grounds and some observational ones for suspecting that such ensembles of 
opportunity may not account for all sources of uncertainty.  Some of the open issues relate to the 
ways the models are calibrated.  Others reflect incomplete understanding of important feedbacks, 
like those involving the carbon cycle.  
 
Relatively few studies systematically explore the uncertainty in climate model parameters or 
structure.  Those studies that have fall into two categories. One set undertakes a large number of 
runs using simplified climate models: these typically produce rather broad ranges of uncertainty, 
but this may simply reflect the difficulty of using observations to constrain simple models.1 The 
other set uses more complex models but much smaller ensembles: these typically give narrower 
ranges that may simply reflect inadequate exploration of parameter and structural uncertainty.2 
The few studies that use large ensembles and complex models5,6 have found relatively broad 
ranges.   
 
Many impact studies use climate forcing from multiple climate models or multiple climate 
scenarios but few provide a probability distribution of possible impacts for a given climate 
forcing scenario.  The result is a striking gap between the available information and the demand 
for information framed in the context of risk and uncertainty that form the essential lens through 
which the entire issue must be viewed.  One possible response to this gap is a greater emphasis 
on characterizing well-defined probability density functions (PDFs) as a foundation for policy 
advice.  There have been many attempts to do this, for example Kolstadt9, Fisher and Narain10, or 
for a survey, Heal and Kristrom.11  An alternative is a fundamental change in the focus of future 
research and the communication of uncertainty as it relates to climate change, with increased 
emphasis on probabilities based on subjective likelihoods of various outcomes.12  The problem 
with proposing these  probabilities, however, is that they may be divorced from the data 
available and may thus appear to be arbitrary.  
 
 
1 For more details on this point see Yohe, Andronova and Schlesinger4, Piani et al.5 and Rowlands et al.6 
2 See Shiogama et al.7 and Yokohata et al.8  for more details on these complex models with smaller ensembles. 
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A third option, the focus of this paper, is to take advantage of available tools for decision support 
that do not depend on information about the entire PDFs for each scenario. Some of the 
approaches that evaluate alternatives, such as expected utility theory, cannot deal with situations 
with limited or no information on probabilities.  
 
Incorporating Uncertainty in Climate Risk Management 
The challenge in evaluating alternative strategies for addressing climate change issues is that 
many risk assessments and climate impact studies provide ranges of outcomes, but with 
relatively little information on probability distributions.  For example, the IPCC AR4 presents 
most of its climate model projections based on multi-model ensembles. For line or bar charts, 
uncertainty is represented variously as the 5% to 95% range, means ± 1 standard deviation, mean 
plus 60% to mean minus 40%, and results of all models plotted individually. For maps of 
projected precipitation, multi-model means are shown only where at least 66% of the models 
agree on the sign of the change, with stippling indicating areas where 90% of the models agree 
on the sign of the change.     
 
A recent report of the IPCC (SREX)14 presents extremes of temperature and precipitation in 
terms of future return intervals for the regionally most extreme value in 20 years, showing the 
median and the range across 50% and 100% of the models that participated in the multi-model 
intercomparison project.  While this is a major advance in the presenting probabilistic outcomes, 
it is still far from providing complete PDFs.  
 
In the absence of complete PDFs, one way to specify information about the tails of the 
distribution is to leave off extremes when the likelihood of an outcome is sufficiently small that 
key decision makers feel that they can ignore its consequences. For example, if climate scientists 
agree that it is highly unlikely that the global average temperature increase will exceed 6 oC  by 
2050, then the consequences of this possible outcome would not be considered in choosing 
between alternatives. More generally,  this process entails specifying a threshold probability and 
removing extremes that have lower probabilities in determining risk management strategies for 
dealing with climate change. 
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Insurers and reinsurers utilize this approach in determining the amount of coverage that they are 
willing to offer against a particular risk. They diversify their portfolio of policies to keep the 
annual probability of a major loss below some threshold level (e.g., 1 in 1,000).15  This behavior 
is in the spirit of a classic paper by Roy16 on safety-first behavior.  
 
Consider our example of the coastal community in Florida reviewing a development at 3 meters 
above sea level. One way of evaluating this is to undertake a benefit-cost analysis delineating 
climate change scenarios where the construction costs, operating expenses and restoration costs 
should it be flooded exceed the expected benefits.  If the cumulative probability of these 
scenarios is below the required safety level, the facility should be constructed at 3 meters. If 
these criteria are not met, then one could repeat the benefit-cost analysis for alternative 
adaptation measures such as elevating the facility so its foundation is at 4 meters above sea level.  
If there is no adaptation measure where the expected benefit/cost ratio exceeds 1 also meets the 
safety first criteria, then the community may not want to build the facility.  
 
 
Risk Management and Ambiguity  
In contrast to risk situations where the probabilities are known, ambiguous (or imprecise) 
situations are ones in which the uncertainty about possible outcomes cannot be objectively 
characterized by a single well-defined PDF. Individuals and institutions are ambiguity-averse 
and will pay a premium to reduce the ambiguity that they face.17,18,19 For example, estimates of 
the PDF of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS, or multi-century time-scale warming in 
response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2) differ greatly among approaches and data sets. To 
illustrate this point, representative PDFs of ECS are depicted in Figure 1. Estimates of the 
probability of ECS exceeding 4.5oC range from less than 2% to over 50% in different studies.20 
Milner, Dietz and Heal use this example to show that the impact of such imprecision on decision 
processes can be substantial.13 
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Figure 1: Estimated probability distributions for (bottom axis) Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity 
from various published studies, collated by ref. 16, and (top axis) corresponding concentrations 
of CO2 consistent with a long-term CO2-induced warming Tmax  of 2oC, given by the expression 
. Current concentrations are 397ppm.  
 
Pursuing this example, the top axis of Figure 1 shows concentrations of CO2 consistent with 2oC 
of warming21 corresponding to the values of ECS on the bottom axis. Suppose emissions decay 
exponentially at an average rate r, and f is the average future airborne fraction (circa 45% over 
recent decades). CO2 concentrations would then increase by a further f/r times current 
emissions E0 of about 10 GtC per year (equivalent to 4.7ppm atmospheric CO2). Limiting CO2-
induced warming to 2oC would therefore require emissions to fall at an average rate of 1.3%/year 
(so concentrations rise by a further E0f/r≈160ppm) if ECS is 2oC and 4.4%/year if ECS is 3oC, a 
major difference. Uncertainty matters in this range of ECS values. As shown in Figure 1, there is, 
however, a high level of consensus across studies that the probability of ECS>3oC is 50% or 
more.   
C2K Cpre-industrial exp(ln(2)Tmax / ECS)
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Meeting the 2oC goal for any value of ECS much greater than 3oC, would require either 
offsetting the impact of CO2 with other forcings and/or deploying large-scale negative CO2 
emission measures in the future.  The scale of these measures will depend not only on the 
trajectory of emissions but also on changes in the airborne fraction and climate system response22 
which will only become clear when emissions start to fall.  Hence the steps required today to 
meet the 2oC goal are not qualitatively affected by ambiguity in the shape of the distribution for 
ECS above 3oC.  
 
Modeling decision-making under ambiguity requires a framework for rational choice in the 
absence of well-defined probabilities. Several have been proposed in the last two decades (see 
Gilboa23 for a review). Millner, Dietz and Heal13 work with the framework developed by 
Klibanoff et al.24 that separates preferences and subjective beliefs, a hallmark of expected utility 
theory. Their model allows one to consider the distributions forecast by several approaches, for 
example, the ECS distributions in Figure 1. The authors demonstrate that aversion to ambiguity, 
given the different predictions, leads to a greater willingness to invest in climate change 
mitigation. 
 
Non-Probabilistic Models for Making Choices   
Non-probabilistic approaches to decision-making, including minimax regret25 and maximin26 
criteria, described in more detail below, can be applied when the probabilities of possible 
outcomes are not known. 
 
The minimax regret approach requires the analyst to identify the regret associated with any 
policy. The regret is the difference between the value of the best policy in each state of the world 
and the value under the policy actually chosen. The optimal policy choice is that which 
minimizes, over all policy choices, the maximum regret (over all states) associated with a policy 
choice. Formally, if S is a state, and P a policy choice, P*(S) is the best policy choice conditional 
on S being the state, and V(S,P) is the value of choosing policy P if the outcome is S, then the 
goal is:  
MinPMaxS V S,P
* S   V S,P    
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Consider the application of this idea to the example of the Florida community determining 
whether or not to permit construction of a residential facility on the coast. To determine the 
optimal choice when using the minimax regret model, one first selects possible amounts of storm 
surge plus sea level rise and calculates the optimal design of the residential facility for each of 
these scenarios. Suppose there are n climate scenarios, and the optimal facility design for 
scenario j is labeled  j*,  j=1….n.   For every other possible design of the facility, calculate how 
far its outcome diverges in present value from the optimal choice for each climate scenario: this 
is the regret for that scenario. The maximum regret is the largest possible divergence between the 
outcome from the optimal choice j* for scenario j and the actual outcome over all possible 
scenarios if j* is chosen. The chosen option is the one that gives the lowest value of the 
maximum regret.   
 
The maximin criterion (Wald26) is far simpler: it involves ranking policies by their worst-case 
outcomes; the optimal policy is the one that has the best worst-case outcome. There is no concept 
of regret here and so no need to measure the differences between outcomes, but merely to rank 
them. It is more demanding to use the minimax regret criterion in that it requires us to compare 
differences between outcomes; however, one gains information in the process. Crucially, neither 
approach requires relative probabilities to be assigned to the different climate scenarios, although 
some threshold would be required to avoid results being dominated by entirely implausible 
outcomes.  
 
Robust Decision-Making 
Robust decision making (RDM) is a particular set of methods and tools developed over the last 
decade to support decision-making and policy analysis under conditions of ambiguity. RDM uses 
ranges or, more formally, sets of plausible probability distributions to describe deep uncertainty 
that play a role in evaluating alternative strategies for today and the future. In contrast to 
expected utility theory, it assesses different strategies on the basis of their robustness rather than 
their optimality. In the context of the design of a facility to reduce the likelihood of damage from 
storm surge and sea level rise, choosing Design 1* may be optimal based on a specific set of 
estimates of the likelihood of each scenario  j=1….n  occurring. However, Design 2* may have a 
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higher expected loss than Design 1* but much less variance in its outcomes, and thus be a 
preferred choice by the community.  
 
Lempert et al.27 review the application of a range of robust approaches to decisions with respect 
to mitigating or adapting to climate change.  A World Resources Institute webpage on Managing 
Uncertainty (http://www.worldresourcesreport.org/decision-making-in-depth/managing-
uncertainty) summarizes several applications of robust decision/non-probabilistic approaches, 
each using various types of climate information.  These applications include the Thames River 
Barrier, energy production in the Niger Basin, water management in Yemen, and flood risk 
management in a large southeast Asian metropolis. The examples illustrate how climate 
information can be used to identify various thresholds or bounding cases beyond which certain 
policies will fail. In some cases robust decision methods generate probability thresholds for 
certain scenarios above which a decision maker might choose a different risk management 
strategy. This threshold can then be compared to one or more probabilistic estimates from the 
literature, such as the study by Hall et al. 28   
 
Conclusions  
Studies by the climate science and climate-change impacts communities have provided a range 
of possible outcomes of climate change. Formal approaches such as the maximization of 
expected utility or benefit-cost analysis are difficult to apply in the presence of ambiguity with 
respect to the distribution of future climate scenarios. For most issues relevant to policy choices, 
the solution is to utilize more robust approaches to risk management that do not require 
unambiguous probabilities.  Risk management strategies designed to deal with the uncertainties 
that surround projections of climate change and their impacts can thus play an important role in 
supporting the development of sound policy options.   
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